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BRIEFING, 20 June 1952, by

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I SHALL DISCUSS THE ORGANIZATION, ROLE, AND MISSION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD, NSC 10/5 AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO COVERT OPERATIONS, AND THE CURRENT STATUS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE STRATEGIC PLANNING BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD WAS ESTABLISHED BY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE ON 4 APRIL 1951 IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR THE MORE EFFECTIVE PLANNING, COORDINATION, AND CONDUCT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF APPROVED NATIONAL POLICIES. THE BOARD IS COMPOSED OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SITS WITH THE BOARD AS ITS PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVISOR. THE FIRST DIRECTOR OF THE BOARD WAS MR. GORDON GRAY, AND DR. RAYMOND ALLEN IS THE PRESENT DIRECTOR.

THE STAFF IS RELATIVELY SMALL, LIMITED FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1953 TO 55 PERSONS, AND ITS TOP AUTHORIZED STRENGTH IS 72 PERSONS. THE STAFF CONSISTS OF FOUR MAJOR SUBDIVISIONS—THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR PLANS AND POLICIES, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR COORDINATION, AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR EVALUATION. THE BOARD IS THE NERVE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND IS THE FOCAL POINT FOR ASSURING THE PLANNED USE BY ALL GOVERNMENT UNITS OF ACTIVITIES TO INFLUENCE THE OPINIONS, ATTITUDES, EMOTIONS, AND BEHAVIOR OF FOREIGN GROUPS IN WAYS THAT WILL SUPPORT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR APPROVED NATIONAL AIMS.

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THE BOARD ITSELF DOES NOT ENGAGE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THOSE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WHICH INCLUDE OVERT TYPES OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

THE BOARD'S ACTIVITIES ARE DEVOTED PRIMARILY TO DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS AND GUIDANCE FOR COLD WAR EFFORT. WITH RESPECT TO FORWARD PLANNING, IT HAS, TO DATE, APPROVED A PLAN TORRENTIAL, WHICH IS A PLAN FOR CONDUCTING PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS DURING GENERAL HOSTILITIES, LARGELY ESTABLISHING THE JURISDICTIONAL DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AND ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES, AND A PLAN SHANKHILL, WHICH PRESCRIBES THE NATIONAL OVERT PROPAGANDA POLICY GUIDANCE FOR GENERAL WAR, WHICH SETS FORTH 8 TASK OBJECTIVES. IT HAS ALSO APPROVED PLANS FOR THE REDUCTION OF COMMUNIST POWER IN FRANCE AND ITALY, FOR WHICH DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION PLANS ARE CURRENTLY BEING PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, AND PLANS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN KOREA WITH RESPECT TO

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EITHER THE FAILURE OF TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS OR THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS. THE BOARD HAS, LIKEWISE, ESTABLISHED GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLICITY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN WEAPONS.

IT HAS IN SOME STATE OF DEVELOPMENT, PSYCHOLOGICAL PLANS FOR GERMANY, JAPAN, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS ALSO SEIZED WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN FOR HANDLING AND UTILIZING ESCAPEES AND EMIGRES, AND THE PREPARATION OF A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR THE DEATH OF STALIN.

*** * ***

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 10/5 WAS PROMULGATED TO PROVIDE FOR THE CONTINUED EXPANSION AND INTENSIFICATION OF COVERT OPERATIONS WHICH WERE ESTABLISHED IN THE BASIC CHARTER OF OPC IN NSC 10/2. ITS BASIC OBJECTIVES PROVIDE FOR THE INTENSIFICATION OF COVERT OPERATIONS DESIGNED IN GENERAL ORDER OF EMPHASIS TO—

A. "PLACE THE MAXIMUM STRAIN ON THE SOVIET STRUCTURE OF

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POWER, INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE USSR, ITS
SATELLITES, AND COMMUNIST CHINA, AND WHEN AND WHERE APPROPRIATE
IN THE LIGHT OF U. S. AND SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND THE RISK OF WAR,
CONTRIBUTE TO THE RETRACTION AND REDUCTION OF SOVIET POWER
AND INFLUENCE TO LIMITS WHICH NO LONGER CONSTITUTE A THREAT
TO U. S. SECURITY.

B. " STRENGTHEN THE ORIENTATION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES OF
THE PEOPLES AND NATIONS OF THE FREE WORLD, AND INCREASE THEIR
CAPACITY AND WILL TO RESIST SOVIET DOMINATION.

C. " DEVELOP UNDERGROUND RESISTANCE AND FACILITATE COVERT
AND GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN STRATEGIC AREAS TO THE MAXIMUM
PRACTICABLE EXTENT CONSISTENT WITH " A, " ABOVE, AND ENSURE
AVAILABILITY OF THESE FORCES IN THE EVENT OF WAR FOR UTILIZATION
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED BY THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL, INCLUDING WHEREVER PRACTICABLE PROVISION

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
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THUS, CIA/OPC LOOKS TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD FOR

GUIDANCE IN DEVELOPING ITS COLD WAR PLANS AND MISSIONS.

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THIS WAS AN AMBITIOUS AND SOMEWHAT SANGUINE APPROACH, AND IN A CURRENT REVIEW OF THE COLD WAR PLAN NOW UNDERWAY THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION DICTATE THAT THIS PHASING WILL HAVE TO BE EXTENDED AND CONTINUING EFFORT PLACED ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF FACILITIES, AND THE RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL. FURTHERMORE, THE OPC EFFORT HAS BEEN LARGELY APPLIED AGAINST MANY TYPES OF TARGETS WORLD-WIDE, AND AN EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO CONCENTRATE RESOURCES ON PRIORITY TARGETS AND AREAS WHEREIN THE GREATEST BENEFITS MIGHT ACCRUE. FUNDAMENTAL TO ALL OUR COLD WAR UNDERTAKINGS IS THE NECESSITY FOR CONTINUANCE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRULY CLANDESTINE APPARATUS WITH THE INCREASING CAPABILITY TO ENGAGE MORE FREQUENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY ON TARGETS OF PRIMARY STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE.

WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF INVENTORYING AND ANALYZING OUR OPC WORLD-WIDE ASSETS PRIMARILY TO DETERMINE THE DATA WHICH WILL ENABLE AN EVALUATION OF OUR RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS AND TO

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DETERMINE THE DEFICIENCIES AND INADEQUACIES AS RELATES TO THE

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IT FOLLOWS THAT THE MORE SUCCESSFUL AND EFFECTIVE OUR COLD
WAR EXERTIONS ARE, THE LESS ENEMY POTENTIAL FOR RESISTANCE WILL
EXIST IN A HOT WAR SITUATION.

INASMUCH AS STRICTLY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS RELATING TO
POLITICAL ACTION, ECONOMIC WARFARE, AND SOCIOLOGICAL ENDEAVORS
MUST BE CONTINUOUS AND PROJECTED INTO A WARTIME SITUATION
AND ARE ADJUNCTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL
CLIMATE TO SUPPORT RESISTANCE AND GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES, WE ARE
LOOKING FORWARD ULTIMATELY TO ACTIVE PARTICIPATION WITH THE
JSPGE IN COORDINATION OF OUR PLANNING.

WE BELIEVE EMPHATICALLY THAT OUR NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
EFFORT MUST BE GEARED TO THE CONCEPT THAT THE COLD WAR CAN BE
WON, AND THAT HOT WAR IS A CONTINGENCY AGAINST WHICH REASONABLE

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AND ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE MADE, BUT NOT TO SUCH AN
EXTENT AS TO DOOM US TO FAILURE IN PURSUIT OF OUR COLD WAR
OBJECTIVES.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS.—Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

PY LIAISON BRANCH

NO.

DATE

TO—	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. PY/VOL		6/30	7/2	DDC	SK — see note.
2. PY/VROP	FL		7/7/52	JK	
3. PY/SP		1700 7 July	8 July	G(24)	
4. 1-X					
5. PY/LN		6 July	8 July	B	25X1 5. Sent to SPC — Rm 21041 for his comment. <u>W.H.</u>
6. 25X1 SPC/	9504 K	9 JUL 1952	15 July	WRK	
7. 25X1 EE-G					25X1 5-b. has asked me to refer this memo from the PSB to you for comment.
8. PY/LN	25X1	6 July		B	
9. EE-G				NOV	25X1 8-9: Is this proposal of interest? 9-14: Have seen copies of Krueger's letter to field to see if they deserve worthwhile to follow up. <u>F.W.</u>
10. PY/SP		12 JUL 1952	25 July	G	
11. 1-X					25X1 PY/LN 1307K
12. 1-X					
13. 1-X					
14. 1-X					
15. 1-X					